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Neo-liberalism as Financialisation1 
 
Engaging Neo-liberalism 
 
When it first emerged, neo-liberalism seemed to be able to be defined relatively easily and 
uncontroversially. In the economic arena, the contrast could be made with Keynesianism and emphasis 
placed on perfectly working markets. A correspondingly distinctive stance could be made over the role 
of the state as corrupt, rent-seeking and inefficient as opposed to benevolent and progressive. 
Ideologically, the individual pursuit of self-interest as the means to freedom was offered in contrast to 
collectivism. And, politically, Reaganism and Thatcherism came to the fore. It is also significant that 
neo-liberalism should emerge soon after the post-war boom came to an end, together with the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. 
 
This is all thirty or more years ago and, whilst neo-liberalism has entered the scholarly if not popular 
lexicon, it is now debatable whether  it is now or, indeed, ever was clearly defined. How does it fair 
alongside globalisation, the new world order, and the new imperialism, for example, as descriptors of 
contemporary capitalism. Does each of these refer to a similar understanding but with different terms 
and emphasis? And how do we situate neo-liberalism in relation to Third Wayism, the social market, 
and so on, whose politicians, theorists and ideologues would pride themselves as departing from neo-
liberalism but who, in their politics and policies, seem at least in part to have been captured by it (and 
even vice-versa in some instances)? 
 
These conundrums in the understanding and nature of neo-liberalism have been highlighted by James 
Ferguson (2007) who reveals how what would traditionally be termed progressive policies (a basic 
income grant for example) have been rationalised through neo-liberal discourse. At the very least, he 
closes, “We will also need a fresh analytic approach that is not trapped within the tired ‘neo-liberalism 
versus welfare state’ frame that has until now obscured many of the key issues from view”. The 
tensions within the notion of neo-liberalism have also drawn the attention of human geographers, not 
least because of their sensitivity to how a general and abstract term should allow for differences in time 
and place (or context) even to the point of inconsistency and, thereby, undermining itself. In surveying 
the literature, Castree (2006, p. 6) concludes, “‘neo-liberalism’ will remain a necessary illusion for 
those on the geographical left: something we know does not exist as such, but the idea of whose 
existence allows our ‘local’ research finding to connect to a much bigger and apparently important 
conversation”, emphasis added. Are we, then, alongside globalisation for example, to accept “neo-
liberalism” for its investigative and polemical purchase despite knowing that it is conceptually flawed 
to the extent of not existing at all? 
 
To the extent that they can be, I seek to resolve these conundrums through a two-pronged assault upon 
them. The first, in characterising neo-liberalism, is to distinguish between its rhetoric (advocacy or 
ideology), its scholarship and its policy in practice. Each of these is shifting in content and emphasis 
(across time and place) and, whilst they have connections with one another, these too are shifting and 
by no means mutually consistent. In addition, there is a complex and shifting relationship between neo-
liberalism across these three elements and the reality that they purport both to represent and influence. I 
have, for example, emphasised these considerations in unpicking the putative shift from Washington to 
post Washington Consensus, Fine (2008) most recently. But, second, these considerations around the 
contradictions within the spirit of an age, neo-liberalism or otherwise, can be grounded in what has 
been a defining feature of contemporary capitalism over the past thirty years, the extraordinary rise and 
spread of finance. 
 
As argued in the final section, by way of conclusion, it is this material factor that underpins, constrains 
and, thereby, defines the current period as neo-liberal and which also is a major factor in explaining its 
otherwise illusory character. I begin, though, in the next section by addressing the role of contemporary 
finance. 
 
Financialisation2 
 
From a Marxist perspective, as a system of accumulation, capitalism is heavily dependent upon finance 
in the form of interest bearing capital, that is finance deployed for the exclusive purpose of expanding 
production for profit. But this specific role for finance is embedded, to coin a phrase, in other aspects of 
the circulation of commodities, money and credit.3 What is uniquely characteristic of the current period 
of capitalism is the extraordinary extent to which such embedding has been both deepened and 
broadened. Such developments have within the literature been best captured by the notion of 
financialisation. This has been addressed from a number of perspectives, but not always explicitly and 
wittingly since however much recognised as such, its effects are inescapable. The explicit literature on 
financialisation is both limited and marginalised from mainstream thought. For Epstein (2005, p. 3), 
“financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”. Stockhammer 
(2004, p. 720) offers an overview of financialisation, acknowledging that it “is a recent term, still ill-
defined, which summarises a broad range of phenomena including the globalisation of financial 
markets, the shareholder value revolution and the rise of incomes from financial investment”. His own 
focus is upon “changes in the internal power structure of the firm”, see below. 
 
Before turning to this literature directly, three further elements need to be added. The first is the role of 
the state as regulator of the monetary and financial systems, and itself as a major agent in the provision 
of financial instruments, not least through its own indebtedness, paper bonds as a form of fictitious 
capital.4 Second is the nature and role of world money, how it is that the relations, properties and 
functions of money in general are realised on a global scale in light of the presence of numbers of 
national currencies. And third is historical specificity in relation to both of the previous two elements 
and their interaction, reflecting particular patterns of accumulation at a global level. In this respect, 
there are generally identifiable and agreed historical periods in which the role of nation-states and of 
world money are distinct, most recently the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods system, Arrighi (2003) 
for a deeper and longer account for example. 
 
The current period is one in which finance has penetrated across all commercial relations to an 
unprecedented direct extent. I emphasise direct here because the role of finance has long been 
extensive both in promoting capital accumulation and in intensifying its crises, most notably in the 
Great Crash of 1929 and the ensuing recession. For Krippner (2005, p. 199), in her overview of 
contemporary financialisation in the United States, it neither necessarily “represents an entirely novel 
phase of capitalism … [nor] do these data allow us to draw any conclusions regarding the permanency 
of the trends documented here”. But, these reservations aside, in qualitative terms, finance is different 
today because of the proliferation of both purely financial markets and instruments and the 
corresponding ranges of fictitious capitals that bridge these to real activities. Most obviously, and a 
major element in the financialisation literature, especially in the United States, is the drawing in of 
personal finance in general and of pension funds in particular. As Langley (2004, p. 539) has put it, 
citing Richard Minns, “it is this commitment to ‘the extension and growth of stock markets and 
“liberalised” financial markets’ that has underpinned pension reform initiatives in Anglo-American 
state-societies over recent decades, also becoming central to the ‘model’ for reform favoured by the 
World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)”.5 Yet the 
breadth of financialisation goes much further than institutionalised investment funds, as finance has 
inserted itself into an ever-expanding range of activities, not least in managing personal revenues as 
emphasised by Lapavitsas (2008) and dos Santos (2008). 
 
As already indicated this fundamental feature of contemporary capitalism, other than in a piecemeal 
fashion dealing in it bit by bit rather than as a systemic property, has best been broached by the 
financialisation literature, limited in both volume and influence, and practically non-existent for 
developing countries. The work around Epstein (ed) (2005) is the most prominent, although more 
important in some respects is the initiative on financialisation furnished by the ESRC Centre for 
Research on Socio-Cultural Change at the University of Manchester, see especially Froud et al (2006).  
 
From this literature, a number of important elements can be teased out, not least from a labour 
movement contribution concerned with the impact of financialisation upon labour market conditions, 
Rossman and Greenfield (2006). First is the rise of institutional investors and the extent to which their 
interests have been channeled as more generally into financial channels concerned with “shareholder 
value”, effectively the making of money out of ownership as such as opposed to the making of 
investments with real returns. In effect, this is to acknowledge the increasing importance of fictitious 
capital, with the presumption that, second, all financial institutions are embroiled in light of the rising 
significance of market analysts. Third, the result is to place financial restructuring and short-termism in 
a position of precedence over long-term investment plans and productive restructuring. Fourth, the 
impact on wages, employment and working conditions is inevitably undermined as a high investment, 
high productivity, high employment, high wage nexus is broken in favour of low investment, low 
productivity, low wage and casualised employment. As Froud and Williams (2007) suggest, companies 
have increasingly become perceived as a bundle of assets to be traded, an exercise in value capture as 
opposed to value creation, p. 14. The result is to create a new cadre of intermediaries, continuously 
financially restructuring enterprises, Folkman et al (2006). As Perry and Nölke (2006, p. 566) put it: 
 
Financial analysts gain power and traders/fund managers pay more attention to them; 
enterprise managers lose power … Most of the principals in the financial system – i.e. 
investors, savers, pensioners, future pensioners (workers) – are not in the picture. 
 
From Keynes’ euthanasia of the parasitic rentier, we are suddenly confronted with the heroic financial 
entrepreneur, who creates nothing but fictitious value, Erturk et al (2006). 
 
But the highly publicised benefits that have accrued both to corporate management and to those 
working in finance are real enough. As Erturk et al (2004, p. 707) observe, “the explosive rise in CEO 
pay reflects the value skimming opportunities of bull market euphoria” although bear markets are not 
without their opportunities either. This has to be set in the wider context of financialisation itself with 
two elements. On the one hand, the proportion of corporate profits as a whole being derived from 
financial activity has been rising, so this is where major sources of rewards are to be found, Krippner 
(2005). On the other hand, a point taken to be crucial in arguing for the presence of financialisation 
itself, non-financial corporations have been accruing increasing proportions of their profits from 
financial activity. Stockhammer (2004, p. 720), in particular, defines financialisation as “the increased 
activity of non-financial businesses on financial markets”, and finds that, “For France, financialisation 
explains the entire slowdown in accumulation, for the USA about one-third of the slowdown. 
Financialisation, therefore, can potentially explain an economically significant part of the slowdown in 
accumulation”, p. 739.6 
 
Stockhammer and most others explicitly connect such financialisation to the issue of who controls the 
modern corporation. This obtains both systemically and at the level of corporate governance itself not 
least, in citing Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) as “retain and invest” gives way to “downsize and 
distribute” in pursuit of shareholder value, p. 721. Erturk et al (2004) set such issues in the longer term 
perspective of managerialism, deriving from Berle and Means and the separation of ownership and 
control. Far from shareholder value signifying the triumphant return of the shareholder, it is apparent 
that financialisation has driven up the rewards for both financial corporations and for the management 
of non-financial corporations, with potential for fluidity between the two. In the era of financialisation, 
CEOs within non-financial corporations have conformed to its dictates and have been correspondingly 
rewarded. Ertuk et al conclude that it is even less appropriate to look to them to drive a wedge between 
real and financial governance than it was previously to see managers as exercising control against the 
interests of owners.  
 
For what has changed is the relationship between finance and industry. As Rossman and Greenfield 
(2006, p. 2) put it, citing Stockhammer:7 
 
Of course, companies have always sought to maximize profit. What is new is the drive for 
profit through the elimination of productive capacity and employment. Transnational food 
processors, for example, now invest a significantly lower proportion of their profits in 
expanding productive capacity. Financial markets today directly reward companies for 
reducing payroll through closures, restructuring and outsourcing. This reflects the way in 
which financialization has driven the management of non-financial companies to “act more 
like financial market players”. 
 
Such considerations have understandably led to a pre-occupation with the relations between private 
capitals, and financial and non-financial corporations, at the expense of the role of public finance and 
world money, although these are addressed in other literature, macroeconomics for the mainstream. 
Inevitably this literature is both vast and oblique in its approach to financialisation for, as Duménil and 
Lévy (2005, p. 17) put it, “neoliberalism is the ideological expression of the reasserted power of 
finance”. Thus, financialisation is the subject of all of the literature on neo-liberalism, globalisation and 
stabilisation, critical, unwitting or otherwise. 
 
What is apparent empirically, irrespective of how it is situated analytically, is that the current world 
financial system has become even more dependent on the US dollar as world money even as the US 
economy itself has experienced relative decline at a global level with peculiarities of its own. In a 
couple of papers, Eichengreen (2004 and 2006) has addressed the nature and significance of this for the 
continuing stability of global financial markets. His main conclusion is that, to the limited extent that 
the current system can be interpreted as comparable to the Bretton Woods system of the post-war 
boom, it is liable to enjoy a much shorter life-span with prospects for instability and systemic change 
on the horizon sooner rather than later.  
 
Across his analyses, Eichengreen does not offer a well-defined theoretical position but that does not 
mean there is an absence of analytical content. He seems to accept, for example, that the current system 
might be sustained for as long as China is willing and able to exploit surplus labour to underpin a trade 
surplus with the United States and to accept dollar-denominated assets in return. There are a number of 
important issues here. One is the emphasis upon the capacity to sustain accumulation through particular 
financial relations, although there is no reason why this should be confined to the Chinese reserve army 
of labour. Indeed, as Eichengreen is at pains to point out, it is not just China that is exporting to the 
United States in return for its currency. This is one reason why he anticipates instability sooner rather 
than later for the portfolio of (Asian) countries to which the US is indebted is perceived to be 
heterogeneous and, consequently, less able and willing to underpin a collective will in support of the 
US dollar. This is contrasted with the greater uniformity of purpose and stages of development across 
western Europe and Japan for the Bretton Woods period.  
 
For the current period, this indicates just the beginnings of a broader understanding of how sustaining 
accumulation across the world involves many more considerations than the extent of cheap Chinese 
labour, with different countries situated at different stages of development, sectoral compositions and 
dynamics, and with differing structures and processes of economic and social reproduction. These 
factors benefit from much less consideration than those concerned with how they are complemented by 
finance. For Eichengreen, these include the capacity of private flow of funds to respond very quickly 
following crises, greater mix and extent of foreign holdings and speculation in capital flows, lesser 
control over these private flows, and the extent to which this has all been driven by the new 
technologies associated with financial markets and its dealings. 
 
As indicated, Eichengreen’s account is motivated by scrutiny of the prospective stability of the current 
financial system. From this, though, implications for the pace of accumulation more generally can be 
teased out. First is the observation that the weakness of the US dollar has induced developing countries 
to hold dollars in line with export-led growth. This is in part a result of the increased potential 
instability that has accompanied both the weakening of the dollar and the liberalisation of national 
financial systems. Eichengreen (2006, p. 5) observes: 
 
The uses to which developing countries have put foreign funds are very different than in 
earlier years … emerging countries … put into international reserves every single dollar of 
private capital received in the last five years, on net, from the rest of the world.  
 
By contrast, continuing the text:8 
 
Traditionally, a not entirely desirable side effect of capital inflows has been a spending binge 
by governments, firms and households which has driven up the real exchange rate, 
undermined export competitiveness, and diminished national creditworthiness, often 
precipitating a crisis. Spending by credit-constrained governments and households has been 
procyclical and capital inflows, by relaxing that constraint, have amplified their response. In 
the first decade of the 21st century, in contrast, the story has been different. The entire private 
capital inflow - and more - has been set aside in the form of international reserves rather than 
being used to finance additional purchases of consumer durables by households, to underwrite 
a construction boom, to support inefficient corporate investment, and to finance government 
budget deficits. 
 
Leaving aside the cynicism, warranted or otherwise, attached to how such reserves might otherwise 
have been spent, this is indicative of developing countries coming to own their own National Debt or, 
more exactly, that of the United States. This is not simply a distributional support to the United States – 
the rich exchange paper for the products of the poor – it is also a system at the expense of the 
potentially developmental goals and provision – household consumption, construction, corporate 
investment and budget deficits, all handmaidens of capital accumulation.  
 Second, though, the impact of these financial arrangements runs deeper still. For their origins lie in the 
liberalisation of financial systems under the Washington Consensus. As observed, this has led 
paradoxically both to the need for higher and higher levels of reserves and to the corresponding 
funding of US indebtedness. And, as observed by Eichengreen in his own way, once opened up in this 
fashion, capital markets incorporate a momentum of their own, p. 18: 
 
Policy makers in emerging markets thus see capital account liberalization as part of the larger 
process of economic and financial development. They appreciate how globalization reinforces 
the fundamental argument for liberalizing international transactions: as a country is more 
deeply integrated into the global economy, it has an incentive to specialize further in order to 
capitalize on its comparative advantage, in turn making financial diversification more valuable 
as a risk-sharing device. 
 
Thus, the impact of neo-liberalism in promoting capital account liberalisation offers some explanation 
for the rise of US indebtedness – higher saving in emerging markets in the form of dollar-denominated 
reserves, and the corresponding lower levels of investment in the public and private sectors. 
 
Third, though, in the last decade, there has been something of a reaction against neo-liberalism, with 
the Asian and other crises having prompted a more cautious approach, p. 18/9:9 
 
But policy makers in emerging markets also absorbed the lesson of the 1990s that financial 
opening should proceed gradually and be carefully sequenced with other policy reforms. A 
one-sentence summary of the lessons of the Asian crisis is that capital account liberalization in 
advance of measures to strengthen domestic financial markets, reform corporate governance 
and adapt the macroeconomic policy regime to the imperatives of open capital markets can be 
a recipe for disaster. Taking these lessons to heart, emerging markets have moved away from 
pegged exchange rates, adopted flexible inflation targeting as a framework for monetary 
policy, and strengthened their budgetary institutions. They have recapitalized their banking 
systems, strengthened supervision and regulation, and reformed corporate governance to pave 
the way to life with an open account. The question is whether these reforms have proceeded 
fast enough, given the growing exposure of their economies to international capital flows. 
 
But the learning of these lessons is not to have restored the status quo ex ante. On the one hand, the 
financial markets have now been liberalised and function in entirely different ways requiring different, 
possibly more extensive intervention to prevent them from being destabilising. On the other hand, as 
only vaguely hinted at by Eichengreen in terms of alternative uses of resources and the developmental 
ideology of policy makers, these changes represent the support of financial interests and activities 
against those of others. This does itself suggest that the study of the global and national financial 
systems in terms of a parsimonious account of the relations between nations is entirely inappropriate. 
We have witnessed the excesses of financialisation in liberalising financial markets, and we have seen 
the financial elite and its activities extended as a result. Renewal of intervention, regulation and control 
has to be seen in this light rather than as a belated if more sensible and balanced approach to achieving 
some sort of neutral target of stabilisation. As McMichael (2004, p. 19) puts it, “the preservation of 
money value increasingly governs institutional politics in global and national arenas, generalizing a 
cycle  of liberalization and crisis management through structural adjustment, at the expense of 
sustained social policies”.  
 
Revisiting Neo-liberalism by Way of Conclusion 
 
To a large extent, the preceding discussion has focused upon financialisation as a prism through which 
to view more mainstream accounts of macro- and industrial finance. But, as already emphasised, 
financialisation has extended finance beyond the traditional to the personal and broader elements of 
economic and social reproduction. For the latter, it is not simply that neo-liberalism is associated with 
privatisation, commercialisation and commodification but, where these do prevail, financialisation will 
not be far behind and even in the lead. As dos Santos (2008, p. 2) dramatically puts it for the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis at time of writing:  
 
By many historical measures the current financial crisis is without precedent. It has arisen 
from neither an industrial crisis nor an equity market crash. It was precipitated by the simple 
fact that increasing numbers of largely black, Latino and working-class white families in the 
US have been defaulting on their mortgages. 
 
But it is not merely a matter of the extent to which financialisation has thereby rendered contemporary 
capitalism subject to crises of potentially greater depth and breadth, of both origin and incidence. 
Financialisation is also complicit in the persistence of slowdown of accumulation since the end of the 
post war boom. It has created a dynamic in which real accumulation is both tempered and, ultimately, 
choked off by fictitious accumulation (although this may be preceded by bubbles of excessive 
accumulation, fictitious or real); it has undermined the role of the state as an active agent of economic 
restructuring; and it has also undermined the role of the state as an agent in furnishing the more general 
economic and social conditions conducive to accumulation, in health, education and welfare, for 
example, that alongside industrial policies underpinned the post-war boom as opposed to Keynesianism 
as such.  
 
In this light, it is possible to suggest in broad terms that neo-liberalism has experienced two phases. 
The first, following upon the collapse of the post war boom was akin to a sort of shock therapy of 
greater applicability than to the transition economies at a later date. This phase is marked by the state 
intervening to promote private capital in general as far as possible and financial markets in particular. 
The second phase exhibits two aspects. One has been for the state to intervene to moderate the impact 
of this financialisation, most notable now in the support given to rescuing financial institutions 
themselves. But, as is thereby evident, the second aspect is for the state to be committed to sustain the 
process of supporting private capital in general and of financialisation in particular. 
 
Where does this leave “neo-liberalism”? Here, the distinctions around rhetoric, policy, scholarship and 
realism are imperative if subject to subtle application. For, of course, opponents of neo-liberalism but 
proponents of capitalism will claim that the second phase is a departure from neo-liberalism. And, in a 
limited sense, they are correct for the rhetoric and the scholarship are not neo-liberal even if swayed in 
that direction by comparison with Keynesian/welfarism. Indeed, the new market and institutional 
micro-foundations (of macroeconomics) and the post Washington Consensus are ideal complements for 
the new phase of neo-liberalism since they rationalise piecemeal, discretionary intervention in 
deference to moderating and promoting the market in general. And, making markets work in general 
increasingly means making financial markets work in particular.  
 
For, the era of financialisation entrenches new modes of corporate governance and assessment of 
performance, privatisation and state support to it rather than public provision, lack of coherent and 
systematic industrial and agricultural policy, pressure for user charges for health, education and 
welfare, and priority to macroeconomic austerity to allow for liberalisation of financial capital. In this 
context, market imperfection economics is not only weaker than Keynesian/welfarism it is so in a 
context where it needs to be much stronger to be effective. As a result, it is both misguided and fails to 
get to grips with the systemic advance of financialisation and might even be thought to promote it. For 
Langley (2004, p. 541), “invigorating the concept of financialisation requires that we recognise that 
particular but related discourses of economy are central to constituting financialised capitalism. The 
cultural making of financialised capitalism is not only derived from mainstream academic (neoliberal) 
economics, but also includes the theory and practice of the likes of management, accounting, 
advertising, marketing and insurance”.10 To this might be added the whole development studies and 
policy industry! And, for accounting in particular, for example, far from being a politically neutral 
instrument of efficient and effective policy making, Perry and Nölke (2006, p. 568) find that recent 
shifts in international standards towards fair value accounting increases efficiency only if, “one defines 
efficiency purely in pecuniary terms … [and] one measures such pecuniary efficiency exclusively from 
the perspective of the financial sector”. Thus, “this reflects and reinforces changed relations of 
production in which the financial sector increasingly dominates the productive sector, nationally 
institutionalized economic systems are undermined, and new forms of economic appropriation are 
validated”, p. 581.  
 
This is not to suggest that neo-liberalism will sweep homogeneously across a globalised world, nor fail 
to be reversed. Krippner (2005, p. 203), for example, acknowledges the ambiguity for outcomes as, 
“increased openness generates demands from citizens for ‘protection’ from the vicissitudes of 
international markets … but too much openness may embolden business interests, constraining the 
ability of the states to respond to such demands”. Welfare programmes in South Korea, for example, 
were expanded in response to the financial crisis, and the globalisation literature is marked by pointing 
to the continuing salience of the nation-state and heterogeneity in interventions and outcomes, 
especially in the field of welfare provision, Kasza (2006) for an overview. Financialisation has shifted 
the modes of interaction and balance of power across vested interests but it does not rigidly determine 
outcomes. These remain contingent, especially in the wake of the continuing weight of state 
intervention, upon struggles to sustain alternatives, not least in seeking insulation against the logic of 
finance. If neo-liberalism is not a temporary illusion, it is only because it is inextricably linked both to 
the state and to financialisation.  
 
Footnotes
 
1
 A much reduced and revised version of Fine (2007). 
2
 The earlier paper laid out the basis for addressing financialisation by reference to Marx’s political 
economy of finance. 
3
 By fictitious capital is meant paper claims to future returns whose pricing is distinct from the value of 
the real assets on which they ultimately depend (with fraud only an extreme case of absolute fiction).  
4
 See Erturk (2003) for the importance of public debt in Turkey for financialisation and its role in 
undermining entrepreneurship and investment. 
5
 See also Cutler and Waine (2001) for occupational welfare more generally. They do observe, 
however, that, “in 1997-8 half the British population had financial wealth (excluding housing, pensions 
and bank current accounts) of less than £750”. 
6
 See also Orhangazi (2006). 
7
 And see McMichael (2004) for financialisation and global corporate food regimes more generally, 
“such that corporate strategies intensify vertical integration (from seed to supermarket) with flexible 
horizontal mergers and alliances”, p. 18. 
8
 Eichengreen qualifies this account in three ways, “The full picture, inevitably, is more complex, since 
emerging markets have also used private foreign funds to finance their residents’ net investments 
abroad and to repay obligations to international financial institutions and official bilateral creditors. But 
the bottom line remains the same”. He adds in a couple of footnotes that “the picture is much the same 
if we consider all developing countries”, and that the result is to “have not contributed as much as 
otherwise to the growth of global demand”, p. 6, indicating a dampening effect other than from the US 
trade deficit. 
9
 See “the new, more nuanced view of the IMF”, Kose et al (2006, p. 34/5), cited in Chang (2007): 
 
Premature opening of the capital account without having in place well-developed and well-
supervised financial sectors, good institutions, and sound macroeconomic policies can hurt a 
country by making the structure of the inflows unfavourable and by making the country 
vulnerable to sudden stops or reversals of flow. 
 
Substitute a few words and you have the World Bank’s rethink on privatisation, and probably most 
other things as well, Bayliss and Fine (eds) (2007). See also Kane (1996) for the dialectic of bank 
regulation. 
10
 Langley goes on to cite the work of Callon who, however, is ultimately drawn both to the position 
that economics makes the economy (rather than vice-versa) and that capitalism is an invention of the 
left purely for the purposes of critique, Fine (2003) for a critique of the ANT (actor-network theory) 
approach that has been influential in the study of finance. 
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